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The neural circuitry of affect-induced
distortions of trust
Jan B. Engelmann1,2*, Friederike Meyer2, Christian C. Ruff2†, Ernst Fehr2*†
Aversive affect is likely a key source of irrational human decision-making, but still, little is known about the neural
circuitry underlying emotion-cognition interactions during social behavior. We induced incidental aversive affect
via prolonged periods of threat of shock, while 41 healthy participants made investment decisions concerning
another person or a lottery. Negative affect reduced trust, suppressed trust-specific activity in the left temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), and reduced functional connectivity between the TPJ and emotion-related regions such as
the amygdala. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seems to play a key role in mediating the impact of
affect on behavior: Functional connectivity of this brain area with left TPJ was associated with trust in the absence
of negative affect, but aversive affect disrupted this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral
trust. Our findings may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective distortions in
healthy and pathological populations.
INTRODUCTION
Trust pervades almost every aspect of human social life. It plays a de-
cisive role in families, organizations, markets, and the political sphere.
Without trust, families fall apart, organizations are inefficient, market
transactions are costly, and political leaders lack public support. Re-
search in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics has begun to
elucidate the determinants and neural correlates of trust (1–3). How-
ever, despite recent progress in understanding the determinants of
trust and its distortions in psychiatric disorders [e.g., (4, 5)], there
are still large gaps in our knowledge about the impact of our emotions
on trust and particularly the underlying neural circuitry.
We focus here on incidental affect, which has been shown to dis-
tort choice behavior for financial and other types of social decisions
(6, 7). Incidental emotions are of particular interest due to their ubiq-
uity in real life and because they are prime candidates for emotion-
induced behavioral distortions. By definition, incidental emotions
are unrelated to choice outcomes and, to the extent to which they
affect behavior, may cause irrational behavioral biases. Prominent
theoretical accounts (8–10) distinguish this incidental affect from
anticipatory affect that reflects how decision-makers expect to feel
about the outcomes of their decisions. While recent research has
made much progress in outlining the neural underpinnings of affec-
tive processes on the one hand (11) and of decision-making on the
other (12), the neural interactions between affective and cognitive
processes that support choice have largely been explored from the-
oretical perspectives (13, 14). It is therefore important to directly ex-
amine the behavioral and neural mechanisms by which incidental
affect distorts decisions to trust.
To study the behavioral impact and the underlying neural cir-
cuitry of affect-induced distortions of trust, we used a modified ver-
sion of the well-established trust game that has also been used in a
number of previous imaging studies (1, 15, 16). In the trust game,
two anonymous players, which we call investor and trustee, sequen-
tially send money to each other. In the first stage, the investor faces
the choice of whether and how much of her endowment to transfer
to the trustee. Then, the experimenter triples the sent amount, before
it is transferred to the trustee. The investor’s decision to transfer
money thus increases the total amount of money that can be distrib-
uted among the two players. In the second stage, the trustee is informed
about the total amount that he received and then needs to decide how
much of thismoney to send back (nothing, parts of it, or all of it). Thus,
while the investor’s transfer increases the total amount of money avail-
able to both parties, the investor also faces the risk of not benefitting at
all from the transfer because the trustee is completely free in his back-
transfer decision. Therefore, the decision to transfer money constitutes
an act of trust, as the investor makes herself vulnerable to the poten-
tially selfish behavior of the trustee.
Trust decisions involve both a financial risk due to the possibility
of losing the invested money and a social risk of being betrayed by an
untrustworthy trustee (2, 3). The latter social risk is specific to trust, as
compared to nonsocial (NS) types of risky choices. To enable clear
identification of the impact of incidental emotion on themechanisms
specifically involved in trust, it is important to include a well-matched
NS control task that has equivalent financial payouts without the
social risk of betrayal. For this reason, our participants also faced
an NS control condition that was identical to the trust condition in
every respect, except that, instead of a trustee, a computer made a
“back transfer” that determined the profitability of the investor’s
“transfer” (16). This back transfer was determined using an algorithm
that drew random samples from the probability distribution of the
trustees’ decisions in the trust condition (see Materials and Methods).
Thus, the choice options and the profitability of the investor’s transfer
in the NS control and trust condition were exactly the same, and the
distinguishing feature between the trust and the NS control game was
the unique possibility of betrayal by the interaction partner in the trust
game (2). This difference between the trust and the NS control game
was saliently indicated at the beginning of each respective trial with
either a human-like symbol on the computer screen (in the trust game)
or a nonhuman symbol (in the NS control game).
The unique possibility of being betrayed by the trustee provides
a strong incentive to avoid this betrayal (2). Therefore, the investor
needs to assess the likelihood of this betrayal when deciding how
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much money to entrust to the interaction partner. This assessment
of betrayal likelihood is accomplished by mentalizing, i.e., taking the
perspective of the trustee to estimate how she will react to given
transfers. In contrast, no such processes are necessary to make a de-
cision in the NS control task. Recent neuroimaging studies (5, 17, 18)
have confirmed that decisions to trust may require mentalizing,
since brain areas commonly found to be involved in mentalizing
[including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), superior
temporal sulcus (STS), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ)] are ac-
tivated during the trust game. We therefore expected that aversive
affect may exert its effect on decisions to trust by affecting trust-specific
activation in regions involved in representing other people’s mental
states, including the TPJ and dmPFC (19, 20).
To investigate the impact of aversive incidental affect on trust
decisions, participants made decisions in either trust or NS control
trials within two different affective contexts. They were either under
the threat of relatively intense tactile stimulation that was somewhat
painful (“threat condition”) or they faced the possibility of receiving
weak tactile stimulation thatwas still noticeable, but not painful. There
was thus no anticipation of aversive events in this “no threat” condi-
tion (Fig. 1A). A prolonged period of incidental aversive affect was
established by administering the tactile stimulations at unpredictable
time points and frequencies for the duration of an entire block. A
block consisted of several trust or control trials in the threat condition
or several such trials in the no-threat condition. The threat-of-shock
paradigm used in the current study has been shown to reliably induce
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Fig. 1. Experimental task and electrophysiological and behavioral findings. (A) Schematic representation of hybrid functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
design, trial sequence, and timing (see Materials and Methods). Participants faced blocks of trust (human icon) and NS control (NSC; computer icon) trials in random
order. During trust and NS control blocks, participants expected either strong (threat) or weak (no threat) tactile stimulation at unpredictable times. At the beginning of
each block, a 750-ms visual cue followed by tactile stimulation reminded participants of the game type (trust or NS control) and stimulation intensity (weak or strong)
for the current block. On each trial, participants chose how much of their endowment of 24 CHF to transfer to a stranger (trust game) or invest in an ambiguous lottery
that provided a 40 to 60% probability of returning an amount greater than the investment (NS control game). (B) The threat of an aversive tactile stimulation leads to a
strong increase in skin conductance responses (SCRs) in the trust game (orange; P < 0.0001) and the NS control game (blue; P < 0.0001). (C) In the threat condition
(relative to the no-threat condition), participants transferred significantly less to an anonymous stranger in the trust game (orange; P < 0.005; reduction due to threat in
71% of participants) and invested less into an ambiguous lottery in the NS control game (blue; P < 0.005; reduction due to threat in 73% of participants). These results
are driven by the emotional arousal induced by the threat of a shock and not by the actual experience of shocks shortly before choice (table S1). (D) In the threat
condition (relative to the no-threat condition), participants made their decisions significantly faster in both the trust (orange; P < 0.005) and the control (blue; P < 0.05)
game. Dot plots in all panels reflect the change for each participant in the presence of threat (threat–no threat) in mean SCRs (B), mean transfers (C), and mean
response latencies (D). These plots thus show the enhancement of affective arousal and the reduction of mean transfer and response latency due to threat.
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negative affect (21) and addresses the limitations of standard emotion
(22, 23) and stress induction (24, 25) procedures as follows: First, the
threat of shock provides an immediate stimulus of biological impor-
tance that triggers an aversive and automatic emotional reaction, the
intensity of which can be titrated to individual subjective percepts and
measured throughout the experiment using standardpsychophysiological
techniques. Second, unlike standard emotion and stress inductions that
are typically administered only once at the start of a session, threat of
shock can be turned on and off throughout the duration of the entire
experiment, thereby reinstating the emotional reaction at every presenta-
tion. This disambiguates anxiety from stress recovery, which is hard to
achieve with standard emotion and stress inductions (26). Third, threat
of shock was administered within-subject in a single experimental
session, therefore allowing each participant to serve as their own
control. Last, tactile stimulation was administered in both the trust
and the NS control condition, thus minimizing demand effects.
We conjectured that incidental aversive affect modulates trust-
specific computations, particularly the simulations of the trustee’s re-
action to given transfers. This has potentially important implications
because if incidental aversive affect disrupts the recruitment of the so-
cial cognitive processes necessary for mentalizing and perspective tak-
ing, then we are likely to observe that it also has specific effects on the
neural mechanisms of trust decisions. We expected that incidental
aversive affect influences trust decisions by specifically modulating
neural responses in regions involved in representing other people’s
mental states, including the TPJ and dmPFC (19). Three pieces of
evidence support our neuroanatomical hypothesis. First, theoreti-
cally, investors are highly motivated to estimate the likelihood of be-
trayal via simulations of the trustee’s reaction to given transfers as a
fundamental aspect of their decisions to trust. Previous research has
consistently implicated TPJ and dmPFC in these simulations of others’
mental states [for meta-analysis, see (19)]. Second, previous research
has demonstrated the involvement of the same neural structures
(TPJ and dmPFC) also during trust decisions and similar social inter-
actions (18). Third, a conjunction of the neurosynth meta-analyses for
the terms “emotion” and “theory of mind” identifies an overlap be-
tween these networks in the TPJ and dmPFC, therefore implicating
these regions in both affective and social cognitive processes. Together,
the above results establish these regions as prime candidates for inves-
tigations of themodulatory effects of incidental aversive affect onmen-
talizing during trust decisions. In addition, we explored the effects of
incidental aversive affect on neural activity in the anterior insula, which
has consistently been implicated in both aversive emotion (27) and
trust decisions (28), and the amygdala, which has consistently (29)
and relatively specifically (neurosynth reverse inference analysis for
“aversive”) been implicated in the processing of aversive emotions
(11) and, at the same time, plays a central role in trustworthiness in-
ferences (30).
RESULTS
Threat of shock induces autonomic arousal and aversive
affect during decision-making
We scanned 41 volunteers while they made trust decisions during the
emotionally aversive threat condition and during the emotionally
neutral no-threat condition. We first ascertained that threat of shock
induced emotional arousal by probing how galvanic skin conduct-
ance responses (SCRs), self-reported emotion, and brain activations
changed in response to the threat of electrical stimulation (note that
SCR was modeled with a general linear model that included regres-
sors for the time points of actual shocks; see the “Skin conductance
responses” section in Materials and Methods). As illustrated in Fig.
1B, mean SCRs during both trust and NS control trials were on aver-
age significantly greater during the threat condition compared to the
no-threat condition (trust decisions: mean difference = 0.53, t39 =
6.20, P < 0.0001; NS control game: mean difference = 0.50, t39 =
5.56, P < 0.0001). Similar observations were made for predictable
and unpredictable strong versus weak shocks (fig. S1A). Together,
these results indicate significantly greater affective arousal during
the threat condition relative to the no-threat condition in both social
and NS game types.
The affective arousal illustrated in Fig. 1B was experienced as aver-
sive by the participants. In an open-ended questionnaire administered
after scanning, 95.12%of participants responded that they experienced
aversive emotional arousal during threat blocks (fig. S1B). The aversive
nature of the threat condition was further confirmed by strong activa-
tions of central nodes of the brain’s pain matrix during the (actual)
experience of strong compared to weak tactile shocks (fig. S1C) and
by the observation of enhanced SCRs following the (actual) experience
of strong compared to weak tactile shocks (fig. S1A).
Jointly, the above electrophysiological results, self-reported emo-
tions, and activation within the brain’s pain matrix during and after
the shock indicate that participants experienced the threat of a shock
as an aversive and arousing affective state. This state was unrelated to
themonetary outcome of trust and risk decisions, as it did not affect the
trustee’s or the computer’s backtransfers. The next question we ad-
dressed is whether this incidental emotional state distorts participants’
behavior relative to the no-threat control condition.
Aversive affect reduces investments during trust decisions
To identifywhether the aversive affective state had a significant impact
on decision-making, we first investigated mean transfer rates during
trust andNS control decisions for each affective context and submitted
these data to a two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) (mean transfer rateswere normally distributed as indicated
by the Shapiro-Wilk normality test: W = 0.976, P = 0.510) with the
factors game type (trust and control) and threat (absent and present).
Aversive affective state significantly changed transfers during both
trust and NS control trials (Fig. 1D), as indicated by a significant main
effect of threat (F1,40 = 17.483, P < 0.001, h
2 = 0.304). We also ob-
served a significant main effect of game type (F1,40 = 20.319, P <
0.001, h2 = 0.337), with larger transfers in the trust (15.37) compared
to the control game (12.67). Moreover, separate pairwise compari-
sons (all two-tailed) showed that the threat condition led to a reduc-
tion of investments (Fig. 1D) in the trust game [t40 = −3.4, P < 0.005,
mean transfer difference = −1.1 Swiss francs (CHF)] and in the NS
control game (t40 = −3.16, P < 0.005, mean transfer difference = −0.93
CHF). To exclude the possibility that choices were affected by the ac-
tual experience of shocks, rather than by the ongoing aversive affect
due to shock expectation, we ran several multiple regression analyses
(section S1). The regression results (table S1) show that the behavioral
results reported above were due to the aversive affect (P < 0.001) gen-
erated by the threat of shock, rather than reflecting the effect of actual
shock experience immediately before decisions are taken (P = 0.23).
Aversive affect also led to faster decision times during both trust
and NS control trials (Fig. 1E). Mean decision times were submitted
to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA (mean decision times were
normally distributed as indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk normality test:
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W = 0.972, P = 0.402) with the factors game type (trust and control)
and threat (absent and present). We obtained a significant main effect
of threat (F1,40 = 17.01, P < 0.001, h
2 = 0.298]. Themain effect of threat
is characterized by significantly (two-tailed) faster mean decision
times in the threat relative to the no-threat condition (Fig. 1E) for both
the trust game [t40 = −3.3, P < 0.005, mean response time (RT)
difference = −0.13 s] and the NS control task (t40 = −2.5, P < 0.05,
mean RT difference = −0.13 s).
Together, these behavioral results indicate that aversive affect sig-
nificantly reduced trust, as reflected by diminished transfer rates in
the trust game. In addition, aversive affect reduced transfer rates in
the NS control task and decision times in both the trust and the NS
control task. Notably, the absence of a significant interaction be-
tween threat and game type for electrophysiological and behavioral
measures (transfer rates: F1,40 = 0.122, P = 0.7, h
2 = 0.003; response
latencies: F1,40 < 0.001, P = 0.993, h
2 < 0.001; SCR: F1,39 = 0.006, P =
0.938, h2 < 0.001) indicates that the impact of aversive affect during
trust and NS control trials is similar across these multiple measure-
ment modalities, confirming that our NS condition constitutes a
well-matched control for the trust game.
Aversive affect suppresses trust-related activity in TPJ
Themain goal of our functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
analyses was to identify the impact of aversive affect on the neural
mechanisms instantiating the social cognitive processes that support
trust decisions. We therefore first examined brain activation in the
regions of interest (ROIs) that we conjectured (see our hypotheses in
Introduction) to be preferentially engaged during trust-specific com-
putations, such as the assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness and
the associated interplay between social cognition and social valuation.
Regions involved in representing other people’s mental states include
the TPJ and dmPFC (19). We used small-volume correction at a
family-wise error (FWE)–corrected threshold of P < 0.05 in truly
independent ROIs defined with reverse inference maps from relevant
search terms on neurosynth.org (see Materials and Methods) (31).
Where appropriate, we supplemented these hypothesis-driven ROI
analyses with exploratory whole-brain analyses as outlined inMaterials
and Methods. Furthermore, our fMRI analyses followed these steps: (i)
We tested whether our a priori ROIs are involved in the processing of
social context or affect by investigatingmain effects; (ii) we then probed
activity in these regions for the specific suppression of trust-related
activity by threat by investigating interactions; (iii) interaction results
were then further characterized by simple comparisons within specific
contexts (e.g., threat versus no threat in the trust task). In the last part of
this paper, we also examined the domain general effects (i.e., the effects
that are not specific to the trust game) of aversive affect.
As a first step, our analyses confirmed that several of the conjectured
regions were specifically involved in trust (versus NS control) decisions
(main effect of task: trustno threat + trustthreat > NS controlno threat +
NS controlthreat). That is, an area in the left TPJ (−57, −60, 27; k = 9,
SV (small volume) FWE-corrected; green region in Fig. 2A and see
also table S2A) showed significantly greater activation during decision-
making in trust relative to control trials.We then examinedwhich of the
ROIs showed a breakdown of trust-specific activity due to aversive af-
fect. To this end, we identified the threat-induced reduction in brain
activation that was specific to the trust game with the following inter-
action contrast: (trustno threat > trustthreat) > (NS controlno threat > NS
controlthreat). A region in the left TPJ showed this significant inter-
action effect (−60, −54, 19; k = 34, SV FWE-corrected; red region in
Fig. 2A; see also table S2B). To further characterize this interaction,
we examined post hoc the impact of aversive affect in the trust game
separately from its impact in theNS control game: This revealed a sup-
pression of activation within the left TPJ (−58, −55, 19; k = 35, SV
FWE-corrected; table S2C) for trust decisions, but not during NS con-
trol decisions (no voxels for NSCno threat > NSCthreat), even at a very
liberal threshold of P < 0.05, uncorrected (see also fig. S2A for addi-
tional univariate analyses that underline the strength of the interaction
effect in the left TPJ). These results indicate that the interaction effect
is based on a selective interference of aversive affect with trust-related
activity but not with activity in the NS control condition. We also
found a region in the left anterior insula that showed the same inter-
action effect (−46, 14,−12; SV FWE-corrected; table S2B), but the only
marginally significant simple effects (trustno threat > trustthreat: −46,
26, 12; k = 4, P = 0.078, SV FWE-corrected; NSCno threat > NSCthreat:
no voxels) indicate a weaker trust-related suppression of activity
compared to the TPJ.
Given that decisions involving trust rely on neural circuitry that
mediates the interplay between social cognition and valuation (1, 32),
we also performed an exploratory analysis of the impact of aversive
affect on trust-related activity within regions commonly implicated
in valuation [ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) and ventral striatum] (33).
No significant interactions were found, but tests of simple effects
comparing threat and no threat during trust decisions showed re-
ductions in trust-related activity due to aversive affect in the vmPFC
and ventral striatum (table S2C).
Aversive affect suppresses trust-specific connectivity
between the TPJ and amygdala
Recent studies stress the importance of the interplay between cogni-
tive and emotional networks (11, 34). Therefore, we investigated the
effects of aversive affect on the connectivity between trust-relevant
brain regions with psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses
(35). In view of the key role of the TPJ in perspective taking andmen-
talizing (19) and the conjecture that these mental operations are im-
portant for trust and our finding of enhanced activity in TPJ in the
trust compared to the control task (see above), we were particularly
interested in how aversive affect changed the functional connectivity
between the TPJ and emotion processing regions, such as the amyg-
dala. ROI analysis of a PPI analysis seeded in the TPJ confirmed that
TPJ-amygdala connectivity was particularly disrupted by threat (No
threattrust + No threatNS control > threattrust + threatNS control) in the
left amygdala (−28, −6, −14; k = 14, P < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected;
table S3A). Therefore, we were interested whether there was a trust-
specific threat-induced connectivity change. To answer this question,
we performed an interaction analysis that examinedwhether the threat-
induced connectivity change in the trust condition (trustno threat >
trustthreat) is larger than the threat-induced connectivity change in
the control condition (NS controlno threat > NS controlthreat).
This analysis revealed that threat-induced aversive affect caused a
connectivity change between the TPJ and a region in the left amygdala
(−26, 0, −23; k = 12, P < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected; Fig. 2C shown in
red) that was significantly larger in the trust game compared to the
control task (see table S3B). We performed a post hoc inspection of
the significant interaction in the left amygdala by investigating the ef-
fect of threat on connectivity changes for the trust and the NS control
condition separately. Aversive affect disrupted functional connectivity
specifically during trust (compare red versus green bars in Fig. 2D) but
not during NS control decisions. A follow-up contrast investigating
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
Engelmann et al., Sci. Adv. 2019;5 : eaau3413 13 March 2019 4 of 16
 o
n
 M
arch 25, 2019
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
threat effects on trust-related connectivity patterns (trustno threat >
trustthreat) confirmed the suppression of TPJ-amygdala connectivity
during trust decisions (−28, −6, −14; k = 23, P < 0.05, SV FWE-
corrected; table S3C). In contrast, during decisions in the NS control
task, no voxels in our left amygdala ROI showed greater connectivity
during no threat relative to threat, or the reverse contrast of threat ver-
sus no threat, even at a very liberal threshold of P < 0.05, uncorrected
(see also fig. S2B for additional analyses that underline the strength of
the interaction effect in left amygdala). Moreover, comparison of con-
nectivity during decisions in the control compared to the trust task in
the threat condition showed a significant suppression of connectivity
during trust relative to NS decisions in the left amygdala (−26, 0, −23;
k = 14, P < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected; table S3D), indicating that the
threat-related suppression of TPJ-amygdala connectivity was also
evident when comparing NS control to trust. Together, these results
indicate that threat caused a specific suppression of connectivity dur-
ing trust that can be observed when comparing the effect of threat
within the trust task (trust: no threat > threat), as well as the effect of
Fig. 2. The impact of aversive affect on trust-specific TPJ activity and connectivity. (A) The region of left TPJ (peak at xyz = −57, −60, 27) that is selectively involved
in trust compared to the NS control task as reflected by a significant main effect of game type (shown in green; see also table S2A). Aversive affect induced by the threat
of a shock reduced activation in the left TPJ (relative to no threat) significantly more during the trust game than in the NS control game (significant interaction effect;
peak at xyz = −60, −54, 19; table S2B). Voxels whose activity reflects this interaction effect are shown in red. All regions survived SV FWE correction, P < 0.05 (see
Materials and Methods). Threat-induced reduction of TPJ activity was observed in 78% of participants during trust decisions (downward-sloping connecting lines) and
in 44% of participants during NS control decisions, as shown in (B). The parameter estimates in (B) are extracted from a sphere (6-mm radius) around individual peaks
within the TPJ cluster marked in red in (A). (C) The left amygdala (peak at xyz = −28, −6, −14; see table S3A) shows significantly stronger connectivity with TPJ during
trust relative to control decisions as reflected by a significant main effect of threat. This coupling is disrupted by the threat of a shock specifically during trust as
compared to the NS control task (significant interaction effect; peak at xyz = −26, 0, −23; shown in red). All regions survive P < 0.05 SV FWE-corrected (see Materials and
Methods). Threat-induced reduction of TPJ-amygdala connectivity was observed in 76% of participants during trust decisions (downward-sloping connecting lines) and
in 44% of participants during NS control decisions, as shown in (D). The parameter estimates are extracted from a 6-mm sphere around the individual peaks within the
amygdala cluster marked in yellow in (C) to visualize the specific effects of aversive affect on functional connectivity between the left TPJ and left amygdala during
decisions in the trust game. Dot plots in (B) and (D) reflect individual participant mean activation in each condition and are connected to illustrate the suppression of
activity due to threat for each participant.
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threat on connectivity during trust relative to NS control decisions
(threat: NS control > trust). This suppression of TPJ-amygdala
connectivity during trust decisions occurred in the absence of sup-
pression during NS control decisions (NS control: threat = no
threat). Thus, aversive affect not only affected trust-specific overall
activation in the TPJ but also led to trust-specific connectivity
changes of this area with the amygdala.
A trust network: TPJ connectivity strength with the
posterior STS, DMPFC, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
specifically predicts behavioral trust
The above PPI analyses show the average impact of aversive affect
on the functional connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala.
However, as we observed strong individual differences in the func-
tional connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala on the one hand
and in mean transfer levels on the other, we asked the question
how individual differences in functional TPJ connectivity are re-
lated to individuals’ mean transfer levels in the absence and the
presence of aversive affect. Following our analysis approach for
TPJ activity above, we first identified trust-specific brain-behavior
correlations by comparing the relationship between transfer rates
and TPJ functional connectivity as a function of game type, regard-
less of the threat condition (main effect of task: trustno threat +
trustthreat > NS controlno threat + NS controlthreat). Given the im-
portance of social cognitive processes for trust decisions, we expected
stronger TPJ connectivity, with other regions implicated in social
cognition, such as our a priori ROIs in the dmPFC, TPJ, and amyg-
dala, for enhanced trust. We therefore examined in our ROIs
whether the relationship between mean transfers and functional
TPJ connectivity is different in the trust game compared to the
NS control game via a flexible factorial model that, in addition to
the factors Subject, Task, and Threat, also includes mean transfer
levels in each condition as covariates. We found a significantly
stronger positive correlation with mean transfer rates in the trust
game compared to the NS control game for connectivity between
the left TPJ and the right amygdala (28, 2, −20; k = 16), the dmPFC
(−12, 54, 40; k = 30), the bilateral STS [right: 64, −43, 4; k = 30; left:
−62, −52, −5; k = 10; note (see Materials and Methods) that the STS
is the most ventral part of our TPJ mask], and the bilateral anterior
insula (left: −51, 21, −6; k = 245; right: 56, 18, 1; k = 525) (all P <
0.05, SV FWE-corrected; table S4A).
For completeness, we also conducted an exploratory whole-
brain analysis (FWE-corrected at the cluster level) that identified
an extended network of regions (Fig. 3, A, B, and D, and table
S5A), showing a difference in the relationship between individuals’
mean transfers and their functional TPJ connectivity across trust and
control games. This analysis extends our ROI analysis by identifying
regions outside our ROIs, including the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) (right: 42, 27, −11; k = 1422; left: −51, 21, −6; k = 343) and
bilateral dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) (right: 44, 8, 28; k = 601; left:
−52, 6, 18; k = 415; see table S5A). In all these regions, we observed
a positive and significantly stronger correlation between mean transfer
levels and functional TPJ connectivity in the trust compared to the
control task (see Fig. 3, A, B, and D, and table S5A).
Last, we also tested whether the slightly negative slopes observed in
the regression lines connectingTPJ connectivity andmean transfer rates
in the NS control conditions of Fig. 3 (A, B, and D) are statistically sig-
nificant. To this end, we ran simple affect contrasts probing for a cor-
relation between TPJ connectivity strength and mean transfer during
NS control decisions in the absence of threat. We found no evidence
that TPJ connectivity with its target regions negatively predicts transfer
rates in theNS control condition, even at a relaxed threshold ofP< 0.05.
During trust decisions in the absence of threat, on the other hand, TPJ
connectivity strength with the posterior STS (pSTS) (64, −43, 4; k =
335) and dmPFC (20, 50, 39; k = 475), as well as the left IFG (−51,
27, −3; k = 429), left posterior insula (−40, 3, 7; k = 578), and right
intraparietal sulcus (44, −48, 40; k = 691), positively predicted
transfer rates (table S5D).
Together, the above results therefore confirm the conjecture that
aversive affect suppresses trust-specific functional connectivity be-
tween the TPJ and amygdala. In addition, the larger the TPJ
connectivity with key regions implicated in mentalizing (the
dmPFC and right STS) and emotion (the amygdala), the more par-
ticipants were willing to trust their partners on average. This asso-
ciation between transfer rates and TPJ connectivity was absent in
the NS control game. These results thus suggest that trust involves
functional communication between the TPJ and a network consist-
ing of the amygdala, right STS, dmPFC, and bilateral ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC).
Aversive affect removes the relationship between TPJ
connectivity strength and behavioral trust
How did the relationship between functional connectivity patterns
in the trust network and behavioral trust change if participants were
exposed to aversive affect? Our previous results showing (i) greater
TPJ connectivity with dmPFC and STS not only under enhanced trust
(Fig. 3) but also (ii) reduced behavioral trust under threat (Fig. 1), and
(iii) suppressed trust-related TPJ activity under threat (Fig. 2) jointly
lead to the prediction that aversive affect should have suppressive
effects on the social cognitive machinery that supports trust de-
cisions. We therefore expected a suppression of the relationship
between behavioral trust and TPJ connectivity with other social
cognition regions under conditions of threat. We tested this hy-
pothesis in our a priori ROIs in TPJ and dmPFC. Specifically, we
examined whether there was a breakdown of the association be-
tween mean transfer rate and TPJ connectivity during trust relative
to control decisions in the presence of threat via the interaction con-
trast (trustno threat > trustthreat) > (NS controlno threat > NS controlthreat).
We found a significant effect in the right STS [64, −43, 6; k = 7, P <
0.05, SV FWE-corrected; table S4B; recall (see Materials and Methods)
that the STS is the most ventral part of our TPJ mask]. To characterize
the interaction effect, we ran post hoc simple effects analyses that
compare the relationship between transfer rates and TPJ functional
connectivity as a function of threat in the trust game. Specifically,
we examined whether aversive affect caused significant changes in
the relationship between TPJ connectivity (with its target regions)
and mean trust levels in the trust game. This analysis showed that
aversive affect caused a general breakdown of the association be-
tween left TPJ connectivity and mean trust in the right pSTS (64,
−43, 6; k = 31, P < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected; table S5C). In this region,
therefore, there was a significantly positive relationship between left
TPJ connectivity and mean trust levels during the no-threat condition
(Fig. 3C, green regression line) that vanished in the presence of threat
(Fig. 3C, red regression line). In contrast, during decisions in the NS
control task, no voxels in any of our ROIs, as well as the STS, showed
greater connectivity during no threat relative to threat, or the reverse
contrast of threat versus no threat, even at a very liberal threshold of
P < 0.05, uncorrected.
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These results suggest that connectivity between the left TPJ and
its target region in the contralateral pSTS supports trust when distor-
tionary aversive affect is absent. However, in the presence of aversive
affect, the relationship between the connectivity pattern in the trust
network and behavioral trust was suppressed. Thus, aversive affect
not only reduced average trust but also diminished specific relation-
ships between the connectivity patterns in the TPJ network and be-
havioral indices of trust. Our results therefore suggest that the pSTS
is a crucial neural node that mediates the breakdown of trust in the
presence of threat.
Aversive affect alters activation patterns within
choice-relevant domain-general neural circuitry
The previous analyses indicate that aversive affect had distinct effects
on neural processes devoted to trust decisions and that functional
connectivity strength between TPJ and its targets was specifically re-
lated to behavioral trust. However, the pronounced affective reactions
to the threatening context also had an impact onNS control decisions.
We therefore addressed the question to what extent aversive affect im-
pacts general choice-related neural circuitry in both the trust and the
NS control game via an exploratory whole-brain analysis, investigat-
ing the main effect of aversive affect: (trustthreat + NS controlthreat) >
(trustno threat + NS controlno threat). This identified a domain-general
network of regions showing either suppression or enhancement in
choice-related neural activity during both the trust and the NS control
task (Fig. 4 and table S6). The suppression of neural activity in the
threat condition (red time course; Fig. 4) relative to the no-threat con-
dition (green time course; Fig. 4) was observed in both the trust and
NS control task (fig. S3) in the bilateral posterior dlPFC (left: −62, −4,
18; k = 686; right: 62, −6, 28; k = 515), left amygdala (−24, −15, −23;
Fig. 3. TPJ functional connectivity is associated with transfer rates in the trust game. Trust-specific functional connectivity (A, B, and D) and threat-induced
breakdown of connectivity (C) between the TPJ and a network of target regions. (A, B, and D) Trust-specific associations between transfer rate and trust-related neural
activity reflecting the main effect of trust are shown in green activation clusters: Connectivity between the left TPJ and its targets is positively associated with trust
(orange regression lines) but not with NS control decisions (blue regression lines) in the (A) bilateral posterior STS (pSTS; left peak at xyz = −62, −52, −5; right peak at xyz
= 64, −43, 4), (B) dmPFC (peak at xyz = −12, 54, 40), anterior insula (left peak at xyz = −51, 21, −6; right peak at xyz = 56, 18, 1), and amygdala (peak at xyz = 28, 2 , −20).
In contrast, mean transfers (i.e., investments) during the NS control task (blue regression lines) are associated with reduced connectivity strength between TPJ and these
regions. In all cases, the correlation between mean transfer and connectivity strength is stronger in the trust game compared to the NS control task (see table S4A for
ROI analyses). (C) The results from the interaction contrast reflecting a trust-specific breakdown of the association between mean trust and TPJ connectivity are shown
in the red activation cluster in STS (peak at xyz = 64, −43, 6; table S4B): Aversive affect causes a breakdown of the association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and mean
trust. The correlation between mean trust levels and TPJ-pSTS connectivity is stronger in the no-threat compared to the threat condition (peak at xyz = 64, −43, 6; see
table S4C). Specifically, there is a positive association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and the mean trust level when distortionary aversive affect is absent (green
regression line), which is eliminated by threat (red regression line). This suggests that connectivity between the TPJ and its target region in pSTS supports general
trust taking only in the absence of threat. The regression lines in (A to D) predict functional connectivity strength as a function of mean transfer levels based on an
extended ordinary least squares model that estimates both the slope of the relationship between mean transfers and functional connectivity in the NS control task and
the increase in this relationship in the trust task (relative to the NS control task). For this purpose, we extracted data from 6-mm spheres around individual interaction
peak voxels (see Materials and Methods). Confidence bounds around regression lines reflect 95% confidence intervals around the model fit.
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k = 226), posterior paracentral lobule (4, −36, 69; k = 309), left
vlPFC (−48, 41, −8; k = 281), and vmPFC (−10, 44, −8; k = 464; table
S6A). Significant enhancement of activity during decision-making
under aversive affect (fig. S4) was obtained in the cerebellum (−4,
−46, −24; k = 549; table S6B). Together, these results identify a
network of domain-general regions whose decision-related activity is
significantly affected by incidental aversive affect. Notably, the regions
identified by the main effect do not overlap with regions showing trust-
specific effects (tested via conjunction analysis), underlining that the
trust-specific effects of aversive affect occur above and beyond domain-
general effects on decision-making.
DISCUSSION
Incidental aversive affect is a ubiquitous phenomenon that pervades
many aspects of human behavior and human social interaction. Here,
we investigated the behavioral and neural impact of incidental affect
on trust decisions.We used an experimental technique that establishes
aversive affect by inducing a prolonged expectation of unpredictable
and aversive tactile stimulation embedded within a hybrid fMRI de-
sign. The threat of painful tactile stimulation significantly increased
autonomic arousal during both social and NS decision-making
and was associated with consistent self-reports of the experience of
aversive affect.We observed that aversive affect significantly reduced
participants’ trust in their partners. To the extent to which aversive
affect is associated with stress, this result is consistent with a recent
behavioral study that showed that acute stress reduces trust (24). De-
spite the fact that aversive affect was incidental to the decisions made
by participants, we observed significant behavioral and neural effects
of the aversive affective state.
Our behavioral results underline the importance of affect in
decision-making even when they are unrelated to decision outcomes.
As outlined previously (8, 36), these findings contradict the assump-
tion of consequentialist economic models that emotions can at most
affect choices by changing participants’ preferences over outcomes
(8). Given that incidental emotions are by definition unrelated to
the consequences of ongoing decisions, they are assumed to exert
no influence on decision-making in these models. Further theoreti-
cal workmay be needed to account for the impact of incidental affect
on economic preferences, such as already proposed for anticipatory
anxiety (37).
Our neuroimaging results provide information about the neural
mechanisms behind the reduction of participants’ trust. We show a
disruption of trust-specific neural activity and connectivity due to
aversive affect.While the TPJ was preferentially engaged during trust
decisions, aversive affect led to a trust-specific breakdown of this
Fig. 4. The impact of aversive affect on choice domain–independent neural correlates of decision-making. We tested the main effect of aversive affect on the
neural correlates of decision-making independent of the choice domain (social and NS). This analysis revealed a domain-general network consisting of the bilateral
posterior dlPFC [right peak at xyz = −62, −4, 18 (A); left peak at xyz = 62, −6, 28 (B)] and two clusters in the vmPFC [left peak at xyz = −10, 44, −8; right peak at xyz = 6, 21,
−14 (C)] and left vlPFC [peak at xyz = −48, 41, −8 (D)]. These regions show significant threat-related suppression (no threat > threat; regions shown in green) in choice-
related activity during both trust and NS control trials. Additional regions that are shown in fig. S3 include the left amygdala (B) (peak at xyz = −24, −15, −23) and
posterior paracentral lobule (peak at xyz = 4, −36, 69). Time courses reflect choice domain–independent activity that shows suppressions due to the aversive affect
during decisions in both trust and NS control trials. To illustrate the equivalent effect of aversive affect, figs. S3 and S4 show activity for both trust and control trials in
separate graphs. Time courses were extracted from 6-mm spheres around peak voxels. The 5.5-s choice period is displayed in yellow and is shifted for 4 s to account for
the hemodynamic lag.
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activation pattern (Fig. 2, A and B) in the left TPJ (and in right TPJ at
a reduced threshold). Moreover, in the absence of aversive affect, we
observed significant connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala
during trust decisions, but this connectivity was disrupted when
we induced aversive affect (Fig. 2, C and D). Aversive affect also dis-
rupted the relation between the connectivity patterns in the neural
network underlying trust and the magnitude of behavioral trust. In
particular, functional connectivity strength with the TPJ was asso-
ciated with mean trust levels for a network of regions consisting of
the amygdala, dmPFC, STS, and vlPFC (tables S3 and S5 and Fig. 3,
A, B, and D). Aversive affect caused a specific breakdown of this as-
sociation for the pSTS, such that the connectivity between left TPJ
and right pSTS no longer predicted overall trust-taking (Fig. 3C).
Our results therefore identify a network of interconnected regions
consisting of left TPJ, amygdala, and right pSTS, for which con-
nectivity patterns during trust-taking are significantly affected by in-
cidental aversive affect.
The previous literature (2, 3) has identified betrayal aversion as
one of the key determinants of trust decisions in the trust game. Be-
trayal aversion means that participants find it extremely aversive to
be cheated in the trust game by an untrustworthy partner. Betrayal
aversion therefore constitutes a powerful motivation to form expec-
tations about the partner’s responses to the various trust levels and to
assess the affective significance of these responses. These processes
critically involve participants’ mentalizing faculties and the assess-
ment of the (negative) affective value of the possibility of being cheated
by an untrustworthy partner (16–18).
The TPJ and the dmPFC have repeatedly been implicated in rep-
resenting and interpreting others’mental states and behavior (19), and
the amygdala has been shown to respond strongly to variations in the
trustworthiness of faces (30) and other emotionally salient stimuli
(38). We therefore conjectured that these regions also play a key role
in the computations involved in assessing and evaluating the partner’s
anticipated responses in the trust game. This hypothesis is consistent
with previous reports of TPJ, dmPFC, and amydgala activation during
trust decisions (5, 16–18). Our present results significantly extend these
previous findings by underlining the behavioral relevance of interacting
neural networks (rather than just isolated areas) for trust decisions. This
ismost consistently shown by our findings that enhanced connectivity
between the TPJ and regions important for social cognition (dmPFC
and STS) and emotion processing (amygdala and vlPFC) relate to each
individuals’ levels of trust.
However, we show that key components of these trust-supportive
and trust-specific neural networks are suppressed by aversive affect. In
particular, we find that threat of shock leads to (i) specific reductions
of TPJ activation during trust decisions, (ii) specific reductions in the
connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala during trust decisions,
(iii) general reductions in choice-related activity in the amygdala,
and (iv) trust-specific disruptions of the association between TPJ con-
nectivity andmean trust. These results thus suggest that aversive affect
undermines decisive components of trust-specific neural networks
involved in the computations relevant for assessing a partner’s re-
sponses to various trust levels and the associated emotional valuations.
This effect is expressed particularly in the change in TPJ-amygdala
connectivity due to threat of shock: In the absence of threat, the TPJ
and amygdala show trust-specific communication likely reflecting the
integration of social cognitive (mentalizing, TPJ) and social emotional
(trustworthiness assessments and evaluations, amygdala) information
important for trust decisions. In the presence of threat, by contrast, the
amygdala shows a general suppression due to the emotional context
(fig. S3), and this preoccupation with the immediate and emotionally
highly salient threatening context seems to prevent it from commu-
nicating with the TPJ. That is, aversive affect seems to reduce a par-
ticipant’s capacity to mentalize about and evaluate the emotional
consequences of various trust levels, and as a consequence, partici-
pants reduce their behavioral trust toward their partner.
At the behavioral level, we observed that aversive affect reduced
both trust and NS control decisions. This result is not expected, given
that the fMRI design was conceptualized and optimized to reveal the
effects of aversive affect on the neural correlates of trust decisions,
which required the NS control task to be equivalent to the trust game
in all respects, except that a randomization procedure and not another
human being decided the back-transfer amount. This finding there-
fore underlines that the induction of aversive affect via threat of shock
was successful. The comparable impact of aversive affect on trust and
NS control trials furthermore confirms that our NS condition consti-
tutes a well-matched control for the trust game.
Despite the similar behavioral effect of aversive affect on social and
control decision, we identify a differential impact of aversive affect
on the neural correlates of trust and NS decision-making. Our neuro-
imaging results therefore demonstrate a dissociation between the
mental processes underlying trust and control decisions above and be-
yond the behavioral effects. This underlines the added explanatory
value of measuring brain activity concurrent with behavior, because
the neural results can reveal the presence of distinct cognitive and
affective processes across experimental conditions that could remain
concealed in experiments reporting only behavioral results. Specifi-
cally, we show an interaction between game type and aversive affect
in TPJ activity and connectivity (Fig. 2), demonstrating that aversive
affect impacted on social cognitive processes specifically during trust
decisions but not during control decisions. Moreover, our neural
results show that changes in the connectivity between social cogni-
tion regions (TPJ-dmPFC; TPJ-pSTS) are associated with trust
decisions but not with decisions that do not involve an interaction
partner (Fig. 3). Our neuroimaging findings therefore suggest that dif-
ferent mental processes underlie decisions across the trust and NS
control games and that aversive affect therefore impacted separable
underlying cognitive processes. Further support for this view is given
by additional behavioral analyses demonstrating subtle performance
differences across game types. Specifically, we find (i) significant dif-
ferences in average transfer rates and reaction times, (ii) similarly
strong correlations within a game type, but significantly different cor-
relations across game types (but within shock conditions), and (iii)
an absence of a significant correlation between the threat-induced
differences in transfer rates in the trust and control games (reported
in section S2). These results are consistent with previous observa-
tions that two experimental manipulations can generate behavioral
effects of similar size but still reflect influences on very different
mental operations (e.g., trust versus general risk-taking) as evident
by different brain activity (39–41). Moreover, if the purpose of the
study is to understand these differences in terms of brain activity
and connectivity, then it is desirable that there are no differences
in behavioral responses across conditions [e.g., (39, 41)].
A notable finding is the threat-related suppression of activity in
emotion-related regions, such as the anterior insula and amygdala
(Fig. 4 and fig. S3). While previous studies have typically found
increased activity in these regions during anticipation of negative
outcomes, such as losses [e.g., (13, 42)] and electrical shocks [e.g.,
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(43, 44)], our manipulation of maintaining a prolonged period of
threat (average block length, about 39 s) suppressed activity in a
network of regions that includes the vmPFC, anterior insula, and
amygdala (see table S6). This deviation from previous studies is likely
due to the sustained nature of the emotional context in the current
study, which differs markedly from the approach taken in previous
studies [e.g., (43, 44)]. These studies have used the application of
short and discrete cues that are predictably paired with an aversive
event, thereby inducing phasic effects on the neural correlates of fear
(45). Our results agree with the argument that anxiety, induced via
prolonged periods of threat of unpredictable aversive events, is dis-
tinguishable from fear, which occurs in anticipation of predictable
and aversive events (45). One possibility to consider in future research
is that fear and anxiety may be distinguishable at the neural level, such
that affect-relevant brain areas may show activity increases in response
to momentary negative emotions, such as fear, but suppressed activity
in response to sustained negative affect, such as anxiety.
An alternative explanation for our observation of suppression in
behavioral trust and its neural correlates in TPJ is that participants
may have simply been distracted by the presence of threat. However,
our finding of significantly faster RTs in the presence of threat makes
this alternative interpretation unlikely, as this pattern of results is op-
posite to what would be expected if participants were distracted or
under heavier cognitive load. Numerous studies have consistently
shown that a hallmark of cognitive load (or distraction) is a slowing
of RTs and that longer RTs are often used as a validation that an ex-
perimental load or distraction manipulation worked (46). Our findings
that RTs were faster under threat are therefore much more consistent
with the interpretation that participants were emotionally aroused
under threat (47) and that this affective arousal affected social decisions
and their neural correlates. In addition, participants’ decisions may be-
comemore impulsive or inconsistent in the presence of threat. However,
analyses of decision variability (fig. S1D) demonstrated no differences in
the SD of transfer rates in the presence compared to the absence of
threat, therefore contradicting this possibility.
While we were careful in using a well-matched control condition
for the trust game by offering ambiguous lotteries that provided ex-
actly the same investment options and probabilities of receiving a
beneficial back transfer, a number of potential limitations are worth
mentioning. These include potential differences in the complexity
and expected returns across the two games. Specifically, trust decisions
might be of higher complexity because no information was provided
about the repayment probability in the trust game, while a probabil-
ity range was provided in the control game. This was done to pre-
serve the social nature of trust choices, as outlined in detail in the
“Task description” section in Materials and Methods. However, two
pieces of evidence lend support to the notion that differences in task
complexity did not strongly influence the current results: (i)Additional
behavioral analyses using decision latency as a proxy for choice com-
plexity (reported in section S3) show that our behavioral and neuro-
imaging results are very unlikely to have been influenced by differences
in choice complexity; (ii) if our neuroimaging findings were driven by
this condition difference in explicit knowledge about back-transfer
probability, then we would expect to see differential activations in re-
gions that process outcome probability, such as the cingulate gyrus,
anterior insula, striatum, and parietal parietal cortex and dlPFC [see
neurosynth meta-analysis for “probability”; for review, see (48)]. Our
neuroimaging results are largely inconsistent with this and instead
support the view that social cognition regions, such as TPJ and dmPFC
supportmentalizing during trust decisions. The gamesmight also differ
in their subjective expected payouts (note that objective payouts were
matched across the games), because our behavioral data show that
participants investedmore in the trust compared to the control game
(Fig. 1D). If differences in the subjective expected payouts drove
decisions differentially in the trust compared to the control game, then
we would have expected activations in a network of regions that
consistently track expected payouts for the main effect of game type,
including the ventral striatum [see the meta-analysis in (42) and the
vmPFC in (49); for meta-analysis, see (33)]. Our imaging results are
again inconsistent with this interpretation, showing activations in the
TPJ and brain-behavior relationships in the dmPFC and pSTS. Note,
however, that our neuroimaging results provide only post hoc and in-
direct evidence for the notion that differences in task complexity and
subjective expected returns contributed little to the observed results.
While the magnitude of any potential effects of these factors on trust
decisions could be systematically tested by future research, our results
support the view that trust decisions reflect social cognitive processes
that are suppressed in the presence of threat. An interesting question
arising from our findings is to what degree these effects of aversive
affect on socio-cognitive processes may generalize to other domains
of social and economic behavior [for instance, see (50, 51)].
In conclusion, we report results that show a significant behavioral
impact of incidental affect on trust-taking, and we identify the trust-
specific neural mechanisms associated with the impact of aversive af-
fect on trust. These effects were observed although the induced affect
was unrelated to the choice outcomes in our task, confirming that
incidental affect can have a powerful impact on behavior and its
underlying mental operations. Our findings inform the development
of economic and social theory and call for the integration of incidental
affect in behavioral models of social and NS decision-making (8–10),
such as done recently for anticipatory anxiety (37). In addition, by
identifying the specific distortions of the neural network activity
supporting trust, we provide a first step toward neural models that
help us better understand these distortions. In particular, our results
support the notion that an important mechanism through which
aversive incidental affect impacts social decision-making is the sup-
pression of activity and connectivity between regions known to be
crucial for mentalizing about other people’s responses (such as the
TPJ, dmPFC, and STS) and the evaluation of socially threatening
stimuli (such as the amygdala). Given that psychiatric diseases, such
as pathological anxiety, social phobia, or depression, are character-
ized by a particularly pronounced susceptibility to negative emotion
on the one hand and distortions of social behavior including trust on
the other (17, 52), our results may also be useful for understanding
the neural circuitry associated with affect-related distortions of social
behavior in psychiatric diseases.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-one human volunteers [mean age (SD), 22 (2.145); 17 females]
from various Universities in Zürich participated in the current ex-
periment. Only right-handed participants between the ages of 18
and 45 with no previous psychiatric illness, no regular illicit drug
use, and no traumatic head injury were included in the experiment.
The sample size was based on recommendations for investigations of
individual difference in fMRI studies based on power simulations
(53). All participants gave written informed consent to procedures
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approved by the local ethics committee (Kantonale Ethikkommission,
Zürich, Switzerland) before participating in the study. Participants
were right handed as assessed by the Edinburgh handedness question-
naire and did not report any history of psychological illness or neuro-
logical disorders, as assessed by a standard screening form.
Prescanning procedure
Particular care was taken to ensure that participants understood all
aspects of the experiment. To this end, participants were instructed
to carefully read detailed instructions and were required to fill out an
extensive questionnaire probing their understanding of the experi-
mental procedures. The accuracy of each participant’s answers was
confirmed by the experimenters and discussed in a brief interview
that lasted for ca. 10 min. Participants were then placed inside the
scanner for a brief practice session consisting of 12 trials to ensure
that they could view all stimuli, perform the task, make decisions in
the allotted 5.5 s per trial, understood the experimental setup, and
were subsequently given the opportunity to ask further questions.
After completion of practice, participants were taken out of the
scanner and washed their hands before placement of SCR and stim-
ulation electrodes. Participants were then placed inside the scanner,
and two ring electrodes were attached to the dorsum of the left hand:
(i) The electrode providing relatively higher intensity stimulation
was placed between 1 and 2 cm below the second carpometacarpal
joint, and (ii) the electrode providing relatively lower intensity stim-
ulation was placed 1 to 2 cm below the fifth carpometacarpal joint.
To determine individual thresholds for high- and low-intensity stim-
ulation, we followed a standard procedure (50) and used a visual an-
alog rating scale with end points defined as 0 = “cannot feel anything”
and 10 = “maximum tolerable pain.”Tactile stimulationwas delivered
via two Digitimer DS5 isolated bipolar constant current stimulators
(bipolar constant current, 5 V, 50mA;Digitimer Ltd.,WelwynGarden
City, UK) and a custom-made fMRI compatible 5-mm ring electrode,
which delivered a maximally focused and centered tactile stimulus. By
varying current amplitude between 1 and 99% of the maximum am-
perage, stimuli with varying intensity levels were repeatedly delivered
to each participant until stable ratings were achieved at least three times
according to the following criteria: between 1 and2 for the low-intensity
stimulus and between 8 and 9 for the high-intensity stimulus. Visual
and tactile stimulus presentation, as well as recording of responses,
was controlled by Cogent 2000 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
Task description
To investigate the effect of incidental affect on trust-taking, we used
a hybrid fMRI design, in which aversive affect was manipulated in a
blocked fashion while social (trust) and NS (control) tasks were
presented in an event-related fashion. Specifically, we varied aversive
affect by creating an expectancy of weak or strong unpredictable elec-
trical stimulation (the duration for both was 20 ms) that could occur at
any time for the duration of an entire block. This expectancy was
created by means of a block cue presented at the beginning of each
block that informed participants about the game type (trust or control
game) and the intensity of stimulation (weak or strong) for the current
block (Fig. 1A). Stimulation intensity was communicated to partici-
pants in three ways: (i) via a verbal cue embedded in the 750-ms block
cue [“strong” for treatment (“threat” condition) and “weak” for control
(“no-threat” condition)]; (ii) via a predictable tactile reminder cue
presented 700 ms after visual cue onset for a duration of 20 ms, which
reflected the exact stimulation intensity of the current block; and (iii) via
a specific background color that was consistently associated with either
threat or no-threat blocks for each participant (color was counter-
balanced across participants) and remained constant for the duration
of a block. The number and time points of electrical stimulation events
throughout the blocks were determined to be completely unpredictable
to participants to augment the efficacy of the threat-of-shock treatment.
For this purpose, the number of stimulation events was determined for
each block by random draw from a g distribution (shape parameter, 1;
scale parameter, 1). Participants therefore experienced exactly one
predictable reminder and, on average, one additional unpredictable
electrical stimulation per block. The exact timing of these stimula-
tion events was then determined at random time points between
the offset of the cue display and onset of the resting screen drawing
from a uniform distribution, with the constraint that at least 0.2 s
separated successive electrical shocks. Timing and order of stimuli
were randomized for each participant to maximize identification
of the effects of aversive affect on the neural correlates of trust
decisions using in-house software programmed in MATLAB.
Each block commenced with the set of cues described above that
indicated the type of decision to bemade (NS control or trust) and the
level of stimulation (weak and strong) to be expected by participants
for the rest of the block. After a brief and jittered interstimulus interval
of 3 to 9 s, the first of three trials within a given block was displayed. In
both the trust and the control game, participants were presented with
a multiple-choice scenario, in which one of five amounts between 0
and 24 CHF could be transferred to player B or invested in an ambig-
uous lottery. In both games, participants faced an ambiguous back-
transfer likelihood: In the trust game, participants were not informed
about the probability of a beneficial back transfer and needed to infer
this themselves for each interactionwith a trustor. This was performed
to avoid biasing participants’ decisions and to ensure that participants
did not simply focus on explicit repayment probabilities, thereby
maintaining the social nature of interactions in the trust game. Ambi-
guity was also present in the NS control game, which provided only a
probability range within which a beneficial back transfer could occur.
To encourage investments into the lottery, the probability range used
in the control game fell between 40 and 60%. This range was based on
previous research that systematically varied the amount of ambiguity,
demonstrating significant decreases in investments with increasing
levels of ambiguity (54). It was matched to the probability of receiving
a beneficial back transfer in the trust game, as it included the likelihood
of receiving a back-transfer amount equal to or larger than the invest-
ment in the trust game (0.46 in our prerecorded trust game data), as
well as participants’ expectations about encountering a trustworthy
trustee as identified by previous research (2). Participants always
had the option to either invest all (24 CHF) or none (0 CHF) of their
endowment.Moreover, each trial presented a novel choice scenario by
(i) varying the intermediate options among the low (4, 6, or 8 CHF),
medium (10, 12, or 14 CHF), and high (16, 18, or 20 CHF) categories
of intermediate transfer amounts; (ii) varying the location of each
choice option; and (iii) varying the location of the originally high-
lighted choice option. This variability was introduced to ensure that
participants paid attention to all choice options on every trial and to
avoid excessive use of heuristics. Intermediate amounts, location of
choice options, and location of the initially highlighted choice option
were fully counterbalanced across conditions. Participants selected
their preferred option bymoving a yellow dot that highlighted the cur-
rently selected choice option up and down by pressing two dedicated
buttons on a standard MR-compatible four-button response box and
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confirming their choice by pressing a third button. At this point, the
selected choice option was highlighted in red for the remaining dura-
tion of a trial. After a jittered intertrial interval (3 to 9 s), a new trial
began. Please note that, to control for wealth effects, participants in
our experiment did not receive trial-by-trial feedback about the finan-
cial outcome of their choices in both the trust and the NS control
game.Using one-shot gameswith no feedback, we precluded learning-
and outcome- related signals commonly observed in valuation regions
[e.g., (55, 56)]. Participants completed 28 blocks (seven blocks per
condition with an average length of 38.75 s) with three trials each in
two runs. Thereafter, generic feedback was provided about the number
of times player B and the lottery returned more or less than the parti-
cipant’s investment, and participants completed an additional 28 blocks
(data not reported here).
Payment determination
We collected trustee responses in separate behavioral sessions that
were conducted before the fMRI experiment using the same trust
game. We elicited the trustees’ choices with the strategy method,
i.e., the trustees indicated their responses to each feasible transfer
level. The trustees gave written and informed consent that we could
use their strategies in follow-up experiments. In the fMRI part of our
experiment, the participants (investors) thus played against the pre-
recorded strategies of the trustees, i.e., a participant’s transfer level,
together with the strategy of the (randomly) matched trustee,
determined the final monetary outcome in a trust game trial. Given
the absence of the trustee on the scanning day, we informed parti-
cipants that they were interacting with trustees in a temporally de-
layed fashion. Specifically, we emphasized to participants that their
payoffs were determined by decisions of real persons in the trust
game and by a computer algorithm in the control game and that
they were assigned different real persons across trust game trials.
Last, tomaintain the interactive nature of the trust game, we informed
our participants that their choices had real, but delayed, consequences
for trustees, who were sent additional payments according to the
decisions made by the investor in the scanner after completion of
the experiment. Results from an exit questionnaire assessing partici-
pants’ perception of the social nature of their interactions during the
main experiment indicate that participants trusted our experimental
instructions and believed that they were interacting with a real partner
who was determining their back-transfer amounts (as reported in fig.
S1E, all ratings were significantly greater than the midpoint of the rat-
ing scale, P < 0.0001). During the experiment, the participants did not
receive any feedback about the behavior of their matched trustees or
the payoff amounts from lottery investments.
After completion of the fMRI part of the experiment, the partici-
pants selected two trials at random by dice throw, and payment was
determined according to the decisionsmade by the participant and the
trustee on the selected trials. To avoid hedging, both payout trials were
drawn from the entire experiment, i.e., the payout trials were not spe-
cific to a condition, such as the trust or control game. If a trust game
was randomly chosen for payout determination, then the investor’s
payout was determined on the basis of the amount transferred to
the trustee and the back-transfer amount of the specific trustee the
investor was paired with on that trial (payout investor = 24 − transfer
to trustee + back transfer from trustee; payout trustee = 24 + transfer
from investor × 3 − back transfer to investor). If a control game was
randomly chosen, then the computer algorithm randomly drew a
payout amount from the distribution of trustees’ back-transfer
amounts. Our procedure therefore created equivalent payout amounts
and likelihoods for the trust and control game.
Exit questionnaire
After completion of the experiment, participants filled out an exit
questionnaire that probed their beliefs about the accuracy of our in-
structions, as well as affective reactions to our experimental manip-
ulations. The main goal of the exit questionnaire was to measure
whether participants believed our instructions. Note that we imple-
mented these measurements routinely although we had little reason
to believe that participants doubt our instructions. Our laboratory
uses deception only as a very rare exception, and we also did not use
any deception in this experiment and fully disclosed all information
truthfully to the participants. Participants were asked to rate seven state-
ments on a scale from 0, indicating very unbelievable, to 4, indicating
very believable. The statements declared that the trust games were
playedwith real persons, that each trust gamewas played with an anon-
ymous trustee, that decisions of trustees were made by actual persons,
and that trusteeswill receive additional payments based on the decisions
of participants on the relevant trial. Participants’ responses were entered
into one-sample t tests testing whether responses were significantly
greater than the midpoint of the scale (2, indicating neither believable
nor unbelievable). Mean ratings for all statements were significantly
greater than two, indicating that participants believed the statements
[see fig. S1E; all t tests survive the Bonferroni-corrected threshold of
0.007; average rating (SD) over all statements is 3.37 (0.86)].
Skin conductance responses
SCRs were collected using a PowerLab 4/25T amplifier with a GSR
Amp (ML116) unit and a pair of MR-compatible finger electrodes
(MLT117F), which were attached to the participants’ left middle
and ring finger via dedicated adhesive straps after application of con-
ductance gel. Participants’ hands had been washed using soap without
detergents before the experiment. Stable recordings were ensured
before starting the main experiment by waiting for signal stabilization
during training and stimulation intensity calibration. LabChart (v. 5.5)
software was used for recordings, with the recording range set to 40 mS
and using initial baseline correction (“subject zeroing”) to subtract the
participant’s absolute level of electrodermal activity from all record-
ings (all specs for devices and electrodes from ADInstruments Inc.,
Sydney, Australia).
Preprocessing and statistical analyses of SCR data were performed
using PsPM (PsychoPhysiological Modelling) (57). Because of tech-
nical problems, data from six participants included only one run (of two),
and data from one participant were lost. Each participant’s SCR data
were downsampled to 10 Hz, low-pass filtered (cutoff frequency, 5 Hz),
and subsequently z-transformed. Statistical analysis of the skin con-
ductance data followed the approach commonly used in analyses of
fMRI data. Specifically,multiple linear regression was used to estimate
SCRs during decisions made in each of the task conditions, that is,
during trust and NS control tasks and in the context of threat and
no-threat treatment blocks. All events were modeled as Dirac delta
functions and convolved using the canonical SCR function together
with its temporal derivative (58). We took two precautions to ensure
that electrical shocks did not influence estimates of arousal during the
decision period: First, we modeled all shock events, entering them as
four regressors that reflect the time points of strong or weak shock
administration, separately for random (unpredictable) shocks and
predictable shocks associated with the block cue. Second, we removed
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from the regressors of interest all trials during which a shock occurred
within an interval from 5 s before the onset of the decision screen until
the button press. All these trials were added as two regressors of no
interest, reflecting decisions made in the presence of strong and weak
shocks. The statistical model therefore included a total of 11 regressors
that reflected the onset times of decision screens in trust and NS con-
trol trials under expectancy of strong and weak electrical shocks (four
regressors of interest during which no shock occurred), cue times in-
dicating the onset of a block, delivery times of tactile stimulation (with
four separate regressors including all predictable strong and weak
shocks and all unpredictable strong and weak shocks), and the regres-
sors of no interest for decision trials during which a weak or a strong
shock occurred. Regressor estimates (bweights) for each conditionwere
then used in follow-up analyses (one-sample t tests contrasting the
difference between threatening and nonthreatening conditions and
strong versus weak shocks) reported in Results.
fMRI data acquisition
Magnetic resonance images were collected using a 3T Philips Intera
whole-bodymagnetic resonance scanner (PhilipsMedical Systems, Best,
The Netherlands) equipped with an eight-channel Philips sensitivity-
encoded (SENSE) head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted
of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75-mm slice thickness).
For functional imaging, a total of 1095 volumes were obtained using
a SENSE T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence with an
acceleration factor of 2.0. We acquired 45 axial slices covering the
whole brain with a slice thickness of 2.8 mm (interslice gap, 0.8 mm;
sequential acquisition; repetition time, 2470 ms; echo time, 30 ms; flip
angle, 82°; field of view, 192 mm; matrix size, 68 by 68). To optimize
functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal
lobes, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 15° rel-
ative to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line.
fMRI data analysis
Preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM8
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK).
To correct for head motion, all functional volumes were realigned
to the first volume using septic b-spline interpolation and subse-
quently unwarped to remove residual movement-related variance
due to susceptibility-by-movement interactions. Slice timing cor-
rection was performed after realignment/unwarping. To improve
coregistration, bias-corrected anatomical andmean EPI images were
created and subsequently coregistered using the new segment tool-
box in SPM. Images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute T1 template using the parameters (forward deformation
fields) derived from the nonlinear normalization of individual gray
matter tissue probability maps. Last, functional data underwent spa-
tial smoothing using an isotropic 6-mm full-width at half maximum
Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were carried out using the general linear model
(GLM). Regressors of interest were modeled using a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function (HRF) with time and dispersion deriva-
tives to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel variation
in response peak and dispersion. Since our main interest was the
impact of aversive affect on trust-taking, we modeled the decision
period for the full RT on each trial, that is, from the onset of the de-
cision screen until participants pressed the confirm button. This ap-
proach implicitly controls for differences in decision latencies (59).
This was performed in the following four conditions: (i) trust game
during relatively high-intensity stimulation expectancy (threat condi-
tion), (ii) trust game during relatively low-intensity stimulation ex-
pectancy (no-threat condition), (iii) control game during relatively
high-intensity stimulation expectancy (threat condition), and (iv) con-
trol game during relatively low-intensity stimulation expectancy (no-
threat condition). Last, the following regressors of no interest were
included in our model: the actually realized weak and strong tactile
stimulations during a block (modeled as two separate regressors, one
including all the predictable and unpredictable weak and one includ-
ing all the predictable and unpredictable strong shocks), block cues
indicating game type (trust, control), and stimulation intensity of the
reminder shock (weak, strong) at the beginning of each block, as well
as omissions of behavioral responses during a trial.
The main goal of the current investigation was to identify the
impact of aversive affect on the neural correlates of trust decisions.
Trust-specific neural effects of aversive affect can be identified via an
interaction between threat and game type in which threat signifi-
cantly alters the neural correlates of decision-making in trust relative
toNS control trials. To investigate the interaction between threat and
game type, an ANOVAwas computed by entering contrast estimates
obtained from first-level models into a flexible factorial model with
the factors game type (trust and control), threat (absent and present),
and participant. We were particularly interested in trust-specific
affect-induced suppression of activity and connectivity, which we
tested via the interaction contrast (trustno threat > trustthreat) > (NS
controlno threat > NS controlthreat) in the context of the flexible facto-
rial design. A covariate reflective of each participant’s mean transfer
in each condition was also included to probe for brain-behavior
correlations. All analyses were also conducted without the behavioral
covariate, and results did not change.
Our main analyses rely on a priori ROIs as we expected regions
commonly implicated in themajor cognitive and affective component
processes of trust to be affected by aversive affect. Specifically, we hy-
pothesized that participants needed to assess the trustworthiness of
the trustee to make predictions about payout probability in the trust
game, which involves regions commonly implicated in theory ofmind
and social cognition (20). To identify regions implicated in theory of
mind, we consulted neurosynth.org (31), which offers a means to ob-
tain automated meta-analyses over a large number of previous fMRI
investigations and thereby provides an independent method to obtain
masks for ROI analyses. To guide and constrain our ROI selection, we
computed the conjunction of the neurosynth meta-analyses for the
terms emotion (forward inference to identify regions that consistently
showmodified activity) and theory ofmind (reverse inference to iden-
tify regions that are specifically involved in theory of mind). This
approach identified overlap between these networks in the left TPJ
and dmPFC, which agrees particularly well with results from recent
a meta-analysis identifying the TPJ and dmPFC as core social cog-
nition regions (19). Furthermore, because of its prominent role in
signaling emotional salience (11), we included the amygdala as an
additional ROI (see also neurosynth search: emotion).
ROI analyses in relevant cortical regions were conducted using
small volume correction with masks created via relevant search terms
on neurosynth.org, while anatomically well-defined subcortical ROI
masks were created using the AAL (automated anatomical labeling)
atlas implemented inWFU Pickatlas. The following independent ROI
masks were created via automated meta-analyses from neurosynth.
org: (i) bilateral TPJ (neurosynth term: theory of mind), with peak
voxels in the left (−60,−56,14) and right TPJ (56,−58,20) and sizes
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of 1031 and 1416 voxels, respectively. Note that the ventral part of this
mask also contains voxels frompSTS. For simplicity, we refered to this
mask nevertheless as “TPJ”. (ii) dmPFC (neurosynth term: theory of
mind), with a peak voxel in the medial dmPFC (−2, 28, 62) and a size
of 3175 voxels. The ROI mask for the amygdala, which is an anatom-
ically well-defined region, was created via the AAL atlas using an an-
atomical mask for bilateral amygdala with sizes of 439 (left) and 492
(right) voxels. Additional exploratory analyses were conducted in
regions involved in evaluating the anticipated outcomes of choice
options, such as the ventral striatum and vmPFC (60) (neurosynth
term: reward), as well as a region implicated recently in one-shot
trust decisions by a recent meta-analysis (28) using the following
masks: bilateral ventral striatum (combined mask of AAL putamen
and caudate up to z = 8), with sizes of 3239 (left) and 3429 (right)
voxels, respectively; vmPFC (neurosynth search term: ventromedial)
with a peak voxel in medial vmPFC (8, 24, −12), with a size of
1327 voxels; left anterior insula with peak voxels at −42, 18, 2 and a size
of 13,844 voxels; and right anterior insula with peak voxels at 42, 18, 2
and a size of 13,871 voxels.
Furthermore, to identify whether extended networks outside our
ROIs show effects of interest, we conducted exploratory whole-brain
analyses at an FWE-corrected extent threshold of P < 0.05 (k > 226,
initial cluster-forming height threshold P < 0.001). Last, to character-
ize activation patterns of interest, such as time courses and activation
differences due to aversive affect, regression coefficients (beta weights)
for the canonical HRF regressors were extractedwith rfxplot (61) from
6-mm spheres around individual participants’ peak voxel that showed
significant effects of interest on BOLD (Blood-oxygen-level dependent)
responses and functional connectivity. Follow-up tests that characterize
the single components of significant interaction effects were conducted
in neuroimaging space via tests of simple effects of interest.
PPI analyses
PPI analyses were conducted using the generalized form of context-
dependent PPIs toolbox (gPPI toolbox (35), using the same statistical
model as outlined above. All voxels that survived SV FWE correction
for the interaction contrast in the left TPJ (−60, −54, 19; k = 95) were
used as a seed region (shown in blue color in Fig. 2C). To obtain an
estimate of neural activity within the seed region, the BOLD signal
from the seed region was extracted, corrected by removing effects of
noise covariates, and deconvolved. Psychological interaction regres-
sors for each of the task type and stimulation intensity combinations
[control decisions during (i) weak and (ii) strong stimulation and
trust decisions during (iii) weak and (iv) strong stimulation] were
created by multiplying the estimated neural activity during the relevant
decisions with condition-specific onset and offset times convolved with
the canonical HRF. A new GLM (general linear model mentioned
above) was then estimated for each participant that consisted of the
original design matrix with the addition of the four psychological inter-
action regressors and the time course from the seed region.
To investigate the impact of aversive affect on trust-specific func-
tional connectivity of the left TPJ, we probed the functional connectivity
data for an interaction between threat and game type. To investigate
the interaction between threat and game type, we entered the contrast
estimates obtained from first-level PPI models into a flexible factorial
model with the factors game type (trust and NS control), threat (ab-
sent and present), and separate covariates reflecting mean transfer in
each condition. A subject factor was also included in themodel. Given
that we were particularly interested in trust-specific changes in func-
tional connectivity, we first contrasted the covariates reflecting mean
transfers in the trust game andmean transfers in theNS control task in
the absence of threat (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat). This com-
parison identifies regions for which connectivity with the TPJ corre-
lates more strongly with mean transfers in the trust game than with
mean transfers in the NS control game. As the next step, we then
examined how threat of shock changed the relationship between
TPJ connectivity and mean transfers in the trust game by examining
the interaction between game type and threat estimated over the
covariates. We illustrated these results in Fig. 3 by regression plots
generated with coefficients reflecting functional connectivity strength
for each of the conditions and extracted from 6-mm spheres around
the peak voxel of the interaction contrast. The displayed regression
plots were generated by the following regression model implemented
in R (using the Regression Modeling Strategies package, RMS)
yik ¼ b0 þ b1Transferik þ b2GameTypek þ b3Threatk þ
b4ðTransferik  GameTypekÞ þ b5ðTransferik  ThreatkÞ þ
b6ðGameTypek  ThreatkÞ þ
b7ðTransferik  GameTypek  ThreatkÞ þ eik
The dependent variable yik is the functional connectivity strength
between a given brain region and theTPJ for individual i inGameTypek.
Transferik is the mean amount sent by individual i in GameTypek.
GameType is a dummy variable encoding whether decisions were
made in the trust or the control task (1 indicates trust, and 0 indicates
NS control task). Threat is a dummy variable encoding whether
decisions were made in the presence or absence of threat (1 indicates
presence, and 0 indicates absence of threat). In this regression, the
coefficient for Transferik (b1) measures the slope of the relationship
between TPJ connectivity andmean transfers in the absence of threat
in the control task (see blue lines in Fig. 3, A, B, and D), and the sum
of the coefficients for Transferik (b1) and the interaction term be-
tween Transferik × GameTypek (b4) measures the trust-related slope
increase in the relationship between TPJ connectivity andmean transfers
in the absence of threat (see orange lines in Fig. 3,A, B, andD). Equivalent
analyses were performed to probe for significant differences between
the threat and the no-threat condition in the trust game in the relation-
ship between functional TPJ connectivity and mean transfer levels.
Here, the sum of the coefficients for Transferik (b1), the interaction
term between Transferik × GameTypek (b4), the interaction term be-
tween Transferik × Threatk (b5), and the interaction term between
Transferik × GameTypek × Threatk (b7) measures the slope of the
relationship between TPJ connectivity and mean trust in the presence
of threat (see red line in Fig. 3C).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/5/3/eaau3413/DC1
Section S1. Ordinary least squares regression investigating the influence of experienced
electrical stimulation on choice
Section S2. Behavioral differences between trust and control decisions
Section S3. Assessing complexity differences across game types using choice latency
Section S4. Assessing the lateralization of neuroimaging results
Fig. S1. Manipulation checks.
Fig. S2. Additional post hoc inspection of the significant interactions reported in the main
paper within all voxels of independent TPJ and amygdala masks.
Fig. S3. Main effect of threat 1: Suppression of game type–independent neural correlates of
decision-making.
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Fig. S4. Main effect of threat 2: Enhancement of game type–independent neural correlates of
decision-making.
Table S1. Ordinary least squares regression results reflecting the influence of experienced
electrical stimulation on choice behavior.
Table S2. ROI analyses investigating trust-specific neural correlates in regions associated with
social cognition and valuation.
Table S3. ROI analyses investigating TPJ-amygdala connectivity patterns.
Table S4. ROI analyses investigating brain-behavior relationships.
Table S5. Whole-brain analyses investigating brain-behavior relationships.
Table S6. Whole-brain analyses investigating the main effect of threat.
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